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This article offers a discussion of dialectics from a complexity 
perspective. Dialectics is a term much utilized but infrequently 
defined. This article suggests that a spectrum of ideas exist 
concerning understandings of dialectics. We are particularly critical of 
Hegelian dialectics which we see as anthropocentric and teleological. 
While Marxist approaches to dialectics, in the form of historical 
materialism, marked a break from the idealist elements of Hegelian 
dialectics they retained traces of this approach. The article offers a 
partial discussion of essential elements of dialectics, which we 
consider to be the analysis of change, the centrality of contradiction 
and the methodology of abstraction. Points of overlap with complexity 
thinking are highlighted together with those points where complexity 
thinking and dialectical approaches diverge. We conclude with some 
suggestions of how complexity thinking might contribute to a 
development of dialectical approaches.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to query the status of dialectics. We 
write from a perspective informed by complexity thinking. We seek not 
to undermine dialectics, but rather to raise questions about dialectics 
that become apparent from a complexity perspective. In fact we see 
many parallels between dialectics and complexity. So we do not 
dismiss dialectics, but rather seek to expand upon the basis of 
dialectics. We see our critique as the basis of a friendly conversation 
rather than a denunciation.  Engaging with complexity may enhance 
dialectics by providing a less restricted account of experience.  
The article is divided into three sections. In the first we provide 
an account of our understanding of dialectics. A problem of providing 
any account of dialectics is that the term has been used in a variety of 
ways. As a result, to quote Ollman and Smith (2008, p. 4) ‘practically 
every aspect of it is contested’. In a relatively short article it is not 
possible to do justice to the varieties of discussions of dialectics, and 
we would acknowledge at the outset that our account will be partial in 
more than one sense of the word: a full account of dialectics would 
involve writing several books; and any account will reflect the bias of 
the authors. Hence we do not claim to provide either a complete or an 
unbiased account of dialectics – but at least the reader will be 
provided with an outline of how we understand the term.  
In the second part of the article we draw attention to the points 
of contact between complexity thinking and dialectics. There are a 
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number of features of dialectics that we would endorse. Reality in 
dialectics is seen as in a state of perpetual flux, and part of dialectical 
analysis is the attempt to understand those processes of change. 
Furthermore several accounts of dialectics indicate that it provides an 
attempt to grapple with the essentialy chaotic features of the world. 
This is a feature that the writings of Marx & Engels would appear to 
acknowledge, and has been one of the key preoccupations of 
complexity thinking. There are, however, features of dialectics of 
which we are more critical. We point to three areas where complexity 
thinking would have problems with dialectics. Firstly, most accounts of 
Hegel’s view of dialectics depict his system as teleological. While many 
subsequent authors argue that their perspectives on dialectics are 
non-teleological, we are sceptical about whether, given the Hegelian 
influence on dialectical thinking, al traces of the teleological heritage 
have been eradicated. Secondly, most, although admittedly not al, 
accounts of dialectics focus on the notion of contradiction as the 
driving force of dialectical processes. While we would not deny that 
there are contradictions, nor that these generate change, it is here that 
we would make the claim that dialectics only gives us a limited 
perspective. Again we need to consider what is meant by 
contradiction, however we would argue that change can also occur in a 
non-contradictory, co-evolutionary way. The emphasis on 
contradiction probably results from the influence of a reading of 
Darwin which sees evolutionary change as a question of ‘survival of 
the fittest’. We would argue that this is a limited reading of Darwin, 
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and would also draw on Kroptkin’s work on mutality. Our final point of 
criticism would be that most discussions and applications of dialectics 
are inherently anthropocentric. This may be an inevitable feature of 
dialectics – and certainly Hegelian dialectics could only be 
anthropocentric. Again we would argue that the result of this 
anthropocentrism is to provide only a limited (that is, inter-human) 
perception. 
In the third section we make some suggestions as to how 
complexity thinking could potentialy provide a means of overcoming 
some of the issues raised in third section. Complexity thinking is also 
highly contested, and the version of complexity that we advocate 
draws heavily on the work of Edgar Morin. In this section we point to 
features of complexity thinking that we consider to be absent from 
dialectical approaches. In particular we wil discuss the co-
evolutionary character of relations between systems, feedback loops, 
and the possibility, drawing on the work of Gunderson and Holing, of 
analysing human and non-human systems as a way of subverting 
anthropocentrism. 
We wil conclude by stating the commitment of our particular 
project, which we have caled posthuman international relations, to the 
significance of exposing forms of exclusion both within the social 
world and in human non-human interactions. While we offer a critique 
of certain elements of dialectics we support the emancipatory projects 
that motivate many of those who adhere to dialectical approaches. 
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The Essential Elements of Dialectics 
For Allen Wood (1993, p. 416), ‘the dialectic treats the world as 
a complex of processes rather than things, reveals everything as shot 
through with tensions and contradictions demanding resolution and 
hence to be transitory, and involved in an inevitably progressive 
process of development’. This definition provides an overview of 
several features that we examine in this section. These are the analysis 
of reality as a totality, the centrality of change, the importance of 
contradiction, the use of abstraction, and the centrality of immanence. 
 
Change 
That the world is in a constant state of flux is a central idea 
within dialectical approaches. At one level this might not seem to be a 
particularly radical claim, as we are constantly aware of changes 
around us. However, as Bill (2008, p. 133) points out ‘most people 
have great difficulty grasping the reality of change… this is largely the 
result of operating with a conception of human nature that views 
people as fixed in space’. To counter such a view raises serious 
epistemological questions. A key element of positivist approaches is 
that the world is made up of regularities and continuities. We know 
about the world because we are able to observe its regularities, and 
when certain events occur (for example, the breakdown of the balance 
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of power) we can expect certain outcomes (conflict). In a world of 
constant change these regularities don’t exist, and hence dialectical 
claims about change imply that we need to consider other 
methodologies for understanding the world. According to Rees (1998, 
p. 6) ‘change, development, instability, on the other hand, are the very 
conditions for which a dialectical approach is designed to account’, 
and this point was emphasized by Engels (cited in Rees, 1998, p. 6) 
when he noted that ‘the whole world, natural, historical intelectual, is 
represented as a process, i.e., as in constant motion, change, 
transformation, development…. the history of mankind no longer 
appeared as a wild whirl of senseless deeds of violence…. but as a 
process of evolution of man himself’. In other words, instead of taking 
things as they appear as positivist approaches imply, ‘nothing can be 
seen as merely what it is, or appears to be’ (Kovel, 2008, p. 239). 
These forms of change are evident across al levels of existence 
from the material to level of consciousness. Hence for Marx (1976 
[1873], p. 103), the central focus was on the development of the 
material forces of production, which had an impact on the character of 
consciousness. For Hegel, by contrast, the historical process was one 
of an increasing alignment between consciousness and the material 
world as humanity moved towards absolute knowledge. This was a 
rational process that could be understood scientificaly, as Buchwalter 
(2012, p. 5) notes, ‘Hegel’s practical philosophy culminates in a theory 
of world history understood as progress in the consciousness and 
self-consciousness of freedom’ (also see Rees, 1998, p. 41). What has 
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perhaps not been fully resolved is whether this process of change is in 
some way teleological or purposeful. For Hegel it certainly was 
teleological – a process of moving towards absolute knowledge. Also 
noteworthy is that in the quote from Engels cited above, he talks of a 
process of ‘evolution of man himself’ – although we can’t be sure that 
he used the term evolution in a directed sense in this instance.  
 
Totality 
In addition to the notion of constant change, a core element of 
dialectical thinking is the notion of the requirement to analyse a 
totality. As with the analysis of change, this provides another contrast 
with positivist accounts. Positivism suggests that the world can be 
separated into distinct parts that can then be analysed separately. 
Such an approach is often described as reductionist – the view that 
analysis can proceed from examining one unit and then combining 
that with the analysis of a separate unit. The perception is that 
individuals are discrete units whose actions can be understood 
independently of a greater whole. The character of western academia 
with its division into separate disciplines of, for example, economics, 
politics and sociology, is premised on the notion that the social world 
can be carved up and examined in different sections. From a 
dialectical perspective this makes little sense, and reality has to be 
examined as a whole. This is because the parts cannot be seen as 
operating independently of the whole. Every unit is impacted by those 
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around it and is affected by the structures that those interactions 
comprise. Wholes and parts create a web of interactions, which means 
that to look at one simple part wil mean overlooking the influences of 
the other parts with which any single unit interacts, and crucialy the 
total context in which interactions occur.  
Examining the totality ‘for Hegel, means grasping the parts as 
mediated and transformed by their interplay with the whole, and 
equaly of the whole as mediated and transformed by its interplay with 
the parts’ (Creavan, 2007, p. 73). In other words, it is not a case of 
just examining the parts and the wholes, but of understanding that 
there is an inter-relationship between the parts and wholes so that 
both have an influence on each other. Hence for Marx, the social 
totality was the capitalist system (Jameson, 2008, p.125) and the 
interaction of any part of the capitalist system could not be completely 
understood without taking the overal context of capitalist relations 
into account. Likewise the capitalist system could only be understood 
by including an analysis of the interactions between individual 
capitalists and proletariat. 
What is potentialy more of a problem is defining what that 
totality might be. Expanding the concept of the totality would clearly 
have implications for analysis. Is the totality a particular society (which 
is what it is apparently for Hegel), or is it the capitalist system (which 
is what the total unit of analysis appears to be for Marx)? Could it be 
the total of humanity, or is it possible to see the totality as the inter-
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relations between species, or the total inter-relations within the 
biosphere, or potentialy even further?  
The requirements to take into account the processes of change 
and the need to analyse the social whole as a totality are 
interconnected, and together imply the need for a form of analysis that 
doesn’t perceive the world of independent units whose central 
characteristic is their stability. Olman (1993, p. 11) summarises the 
contribution that dialectics contributes to resolving this problem ‘by 
expanding our notion of anything to include, as aspects of what it is, 
both the process by which it has become that and the broader 
interactive context in which it is found.’ This leads to a further two 
features of dialectical analysis. 
 
Contradiction 
So far we have seen the significance of understanding the 
totality as far as a dialectical analysis is concerned, and that everything 
within the totality is in a state of flux. For dialectical thinking 
contradiction is the driving force for this continual change. For Hegel 
(cited in Creavan, 2007, p. 75), ‘contradiction is at the root of al 
movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a 
contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.’ 
Ultimately, if we want to understand the processes of change then we 
need to understand the contradictions between different elements. 
While for Hegel, consciousness was the level at which contradictions 
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occurred – normally summarized as the development of a pattern of 
thesis – antithesis – synthesis, for Marx, contradictions played out at a 
material level. For Marx, ‘analysis starts out from real, material, 
empirically verifiable contradictions. The forces involved are not 
merely ideas or even ideologies, though these are also present, but 
real economic and political institutions, classes, parties’ (Rees, 1998, 
p. 83). 
The working out of contradictions is not just about resolving 
differences, or one element of the contradiction overcoming the other. 
Both parts of the contradiction are changed as a result of the process 
of resolving contradictions, with the new element that arises 
containing elements of both. Hegel referred to this as the ‘negation of 
the negation’, a process whereby ‘new and distinct situations arise 
from contradictory circumstances in such a way that that aspects of 
the old circumstances appear, transformed, as part of the new 
conditions’ (Rees 1998, p. 9). This also involved a forward progressive 
movement for Hegel, with each occurrence of the negation of the 
negation in the science of logic placing ‘the absolute under a more 
comprehensive, more nearly true identifying description’ (Butler, 2012 
p. 23).  
Perhaps the most famous such contradiction from a Marxist 
perspective is that of class conflict. Differences between classes, 
specifically between an exploiting and an exploited class, drive the 
onwards movement of history. A communist society would involve the 
final resolution of such a contradiction with the appearance of a 
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classless society. This was not, then, simply a case of one class 
winning out over the other, but of both classes being transformed in 
the process of resolving the contradictions. 
As Shannon Brincat (2010, p. 681) notes ‘the dialectical tradition 
is characterized by its ontological focus on change through 
contradiction.’ Hence the concept of contradiction is central to 
analyzing the historical process, and Jameson (2008, p. 128) argues 
that when one fails to see contradictions that one has stopped 
thinking dialectically. It is the working out of contradictions that drives 
the historical process further. This would appear to have a progressive 
element to it. Hegel’s views were certainly teleological in that the 
working out of contradictions moves consciousness forwards to a 
more accurate perception. 
 
Abstraction 
Confronted by a world of constant change, and by the need to 
analyse the world as a totality, the methodology adopted by Marx was 
one of abstraction. This approach is described by  
Smith (1993, p. 4) as ‘systematic dialectics’. This comprises the 
analysis of ‘a progression of categories that moves in a step by step 
fashion to progressively more advanced determinations’ (Smith, 1993, 
p. 55). This methodology comprises the focusing on those aspects 
most relevant for the subject of study.  
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For Marx, in attempting to understand the capitalist system this 
involved, in the first instance distinguishing between those features of 
society that were immediately relevant, and those that were less 
relevant. As Olman (2008, p. 16) argues, ‘by starting with the decision 
to exclude al non-capitalist levels of generality from his awareness… 
Marx avoids tripping on what human society or class history or the 
other levels mentioned have placed in his way in carrying out his work 
as the systematizer of capitalism.’ According to Olman (2008, p. 16-
17) the frequent criticism of Marx that he overlooks other forms of 
exclusion such as race or gender misses the point, as these pre-date 
capitalism, and therefore ‘cannot be part of what is distinctive about 
capitalism.’ The point of the critique however, is to suggest the 
difficulty of understanding the distinction of capitalist processes when 
they are so much bound up with the systemic imperatives of ethnic 
and gender structuring. The debate about analytic distinction and 
relevance is stil very much with us, for example, in contemporary 
debates in feminist theory. There are frictions between those accounts 
of gender which insist on the inseparable nature of race, class, gender 
and other differences (Haraway, 1989, 1991) and those engaged with 
analytic separation prior to an examination of interlinked processes 
(Marx-Feree, 2012; Walby, 1990, 2009). It is interesting to note that 
the approaches eschewing conflationary analytics have themselves 
been influenced by complexity thinking.  
Marx’s own systematic analysis proceeds through a number of 
steps, moving from the highly abstract, and moving towards the more 
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concrete – or as Teschke and Heine (1996, pp. 411-412) cal it 
‘concrete totality’.  
Having isolated the key features of capitalism, Marx’s next move 
is to consider the character of the interactions between these 
elements. Crucialy, for Marx, capitalism is an inherently dynamic 
system which links features within the totality – ‘conditions never 
come into Marx’s study without umbilical ties to the people who affect 
and are affected by them’ (Olman, 2008, p. 17). Capitalism is a 
restless expansive force, with competition between capitalists being 
the force which encourages capitalists to constantly innovate in their 
drive to maximize profits (Harvey, 2000, pp 21-40). Marx’s next step 
is to consider what needed to exist in the past to bring about what 
exists in the present. ‘What Marx uncovers in his reconstruction of the 
present … guides him in his search into the past, helping him decide 
what to look for as wel as how far to go in looking for it’ (Olman, 
2008, p. 17). The final step that Marx takes, having considered the 
present, and how that emerged from the past is to reconstruct the 
forces in the present as contradictory elements, and to project those 
contradictory features into the future. Contained in this analysis is a 
consideration of the social forms that make the persistence of 
capitalism unlikely (for example a tendency for the rate of profit to 
fal), together with those elements that suggest that socialism is 
‘becoming increasingly practical, rational, conceivable, necessary, and 
even obvious’ (Olman, 2008, p. 19). 
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Complexity Thinking and Dialectics 
Thus far we have summarized our view of the main elements of 
dialectical thinking. In this section we compare dialectics to 
complexity approaches. One thing that these two approaches certainly 
share is a lack a single viewpoint as to what they comprise. Elsewhere 
(Cudworth & Hobden, 2009), we have summarized four ways in which 
complexity thinking has been approached in the social sciences. Our 
approach draws in particular on the work of Morin, and Gunderson 
and Holing together with their various associates (see Cudworth & 
Hobden, 2011). We prefer to use the more general term complexity 
thinking rather than the term complexity theory, because there is no 
one complexity theory, rather, a broad range of complexity 
approaches, which share some common concepts. Here we wil give a 
brief summary of three concepts that we see as core to complexity 
thinking (complex adaptive systems, self-organisation and emergence) 
before moving on to see where there are overlaps with dialectical 
thinking, and where there are differences. 
 
Features of Complexity Thinking 
Central to complexity thinking is the complex adaptive system. 
Systems thinking has, perhaps understandably, been the target of 
considerable criticism. In the work of sociologists such as Parsons 
(1951, 1960), and the International Relations theorist Waltz (1979) 
systems have been seen as fixed, closed, and tending towards 
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equilibrium. Complex adaptive systems, by contrast can be perceived 
as open, dynamic, and both potentialy capable of moving closer to 
equilibrium as wel as potentialy moving away. From this perspective 
we live in a ‘world of systems’ (Bunge, 1979). Everything above the 
level of the most elementary particles is a system, and the 
environment for any one system is provided by al other system. We 
live in a totaly interconnected universe, even if connections with some 
systems are rather minimal. Systems can therefore be considered as a 
boundary, although systems intersect and overlap with each other. An 
example would be a human body. A human body comprises many 
systems in itself. It absorbs other systems as food, and affects and is 
affected by a whole range of other systems. 
Complex adaptive systems are perceived as open in the sense 
that they have permeable borders which can be traversed by other 
systems. The human body for example can be invaded by viruses. 
Complex adaptive systems are inherently dynamic in that they are 
constantly in a process of interaction in with their environment. They 
are also subject to processes of feedback – which can be stabilizing 
(negative feedback), or can lead systems away from equilibrium, 
potentialy to such an extent that the system colapses, or flips to an 
alternate state. 
A significant feature of complex adaptive systems is that 
developments, both within and between systems are viewed as being 
non-linear. A smal change can have a disproportionately large and 
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unpredictable outcome, whilst large effects can lead to minimal 
changes in systems. 
A final feature that we mention is that the overlapping and 
intersected character of complex adaptive systems permits the 
analysis of multiple forms of exclusion. For example, in her work on 
globalization Walby (2009) develops an analysis of the multiple ways 
in which globalization processes have impacted on groups in society.  
A second element of complexity thinking is the idea of self-
organisation. In complexity thinking this is regarded as an inherent 
tendency in matter. The most extreme example of this would be the 
transition from the soup of elementary particles that appeared at the 
time of the big bang, to the human brain. For complexity thinking 
there is an assumption that same sort of processes are at work in the 
social world. The character of these processes is open to debate, with 
some (for example, Capra, 2002) suggesting that there is a continuity 
between human and non-human systems, while others suggest that as 
‘human beings are sense making animals’ (Westley et al, 2002, p.108) 
that we need to think about social world differently.  
It is this tendency towards self-organisation that underlies the 
processes which lead to the appearance of complex adaptive systems. 
The notion of a complex adaptive system provides the corner stone of 
complexity thinking, while self organization suggests that there is an 
inherent tendency for matter to organize in increasingly complex 
forms. The link between these two features is emergence, which 
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provides a way of thinking about the character of the whole/part 
relationship.  
Emergence refers to the unpredictable character of features 
which appear at the system level. In complex adaptive systems it is 
argued that the features at the system level will not only be more than 
the sum of the parts, they will also not be predictable from looking at 
the parts of a system. Higher levels of a system are dependent on the 
parts but not reducible to them. For example, consciousness is seen 
as an emergent feature of the brain, the features of which couldn’t be 
derived from simply looking at the physical elements of the brain.  
Having laid out some elements of a complex approach, we now 
turn to thinking about the similarities and differences with dialectical 
thinking. 
 
Points of Overlap 
In this section we draw attention to two points of overlap 
between dialectic and complexity thinking, namely the analysis of a 
totality, and the centrality of change. 
Both dialectical thinking and complexity thinking perceive the 
necessity of an analysis that includes an awareness of what might be 
called a totality. For both forms of analysis this is a reaction to what 
might be called positivist, scientific, or reductionist thinking. In other 
words, it is not possible to break the world up into discrete elements 
and analyse these separately. In this sense there are no discrete units, 
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and any attempt to understand discrete units would be limited 
because of a lack of knowledge about the context in which they 
operate, and the impacts of the environment in which they operate. 
While it may appear to make sense for the social sciences - confronted 
as they are by a world of innumerable actors and interactions - to 
operate a disciplinary division of labour, for both complexity thinking 
and dialectical thinking such a separation makes no sense. In addition, 
such a division of labour may have the result of producing limited or 
inaccurate information. An example might be the attempt to develop 
an understanding of economics outside of a social and political 
context. We might also add that it is impossible to understand 
economics outside of an ecological context. Likewise, an individual 
cannot be understood as separate from the society, or the individual’s 
impact on society. 
In our discussion of dialectics, we noted that what constitutes 
the totality was not always clear. However for complexity thinking it is 
apparent that by totality it realy is totality that is meant. The 
environment for any one system is made up of al other systems, and 
crucialy, due to non-linearity, minor happenings even in distant 
systems can major implications. This extends beyond the human and 
social world to non-human systems, both animate and inanimate. With 
its analysis of overlapping and intersected systems complexity 
thinking alows the possibility of developing an analysis where the 
human world is perceived as embedded within non-human systems of 
varying kinds. So, for example, the inter-relations between human 
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systems and climatic systems can be analysed as well as taking into 
consideration impacts that this has on other species. The implications 
of this are problematic for analysis in complex systems. An implication 
of the view that distant minor events can have major local impacts 
comes the awareness that, in a situation of almost infinite systems, 
that there is a large element of unpredictability. From an analytical 
point of view this is problematic, particularly if the criteria for the 
assessment of perspectives is their ability to predict. This is a point to 
which we will return later.  
A second area with which there is considerable agreement 
between complexity and dialectical thinking is the condition of 
change. Both approaches see the world as being in a constant state of 
flux. As with the view of the necessity of considering the analytical 
totality, this can be seen as an explicit challenge to positivist thinking. 
Rather than an expectation that it is possible to establish regularities, 
the understanding of both complex and dialectical thought is that 
there are unlikely to be regularities, or that any regularities are likely 
to be short lived. 
The notion of change and the attempt to understand such a 
change is central to both complexity and dialectic approaches, and as 
we will see they have different ways of attempting to understand this 
change. The analysis of change relates to the analysis of the totality or 
system, and change can occur at any level. Both complexity and 
dialectical thought can be seen as historical approaches, attempting to 
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understand how develops in the past generated the current day 
circumstances. 
For both there is a view that the processes of change are neither 
smooth nor continuous. Hegel captured this notion with the view that 
there is a ‘transformation of quantity into quality’ – that small, perhaps 
imperceptible changes will at some point translate into a change of 
attributes. Complexity theorists describe this as a ‘tipping point’ or a 
‘phase change’, referring to the point at which the characteristics of a 
system change undergo a radical transformation, or collapse. Such 
revolutions can be both sudden and unpredictable.  
While there is an underlying expectation of the possibility of 
radical and unpredictable change to both forms of thinking, for 
complexity thinking the future would appear to be much more open 
than for dialectical thought. In the discussion of dialectics earlier, 
Ollman suggested that part of the methodology was to identify those 
elements of a socialist future that existed in present arrangements. 
Complexity thinkers would certainly agree that the conditions for the 
future would be found in the present, but would be much more 
cautious about how those conditions could be pursued to encourage a 
more equitable future – while accepting that such a future is both 
possible and desirable. Here a central contribution of complexity 
thinking would be that in moving towards a sustainable and equitable 
future there is a need to take in and deal with a world of complexity. 
In Morin’s (2008, p. 96) words we need to develop ‘the art of working 
with uncertainty’. An important element of complexity thinking then is 
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to develop notions of how practice may be organised under conditions 
of complexity. Law and Urry (2004), for example, have considered the 
possibilities of a project in which we ‘enact the social’. 
As we will see in the next section dialectical and complex 
thought have different views on what drives such change and whether 
such change has a particular direction, and perhaps end point. 
However it is an expectation of both that change is a central feature of 
existence.  
 
Points of contention. 
In this section we raise three points of contention between 
complexity and dialectical thinking: contr diction, teleology, and 
anthropocentrism. 
As we saw earlier contradiction is at the heart of dialectical 
thinking, and this is a view that is supported by most commentators 
on this approach [but not all]. Complexity thinking would accept 
absolutely that there are contradictions in society, and also that there 
are multiple forms of social exclusion. A central element of Walby’s 
(2009) work on globalization, for example has been to use complexity 
thinking to highlight multiple forms of social exclusion. The point that 
complexity thought would challenge is that this is the only way in 
which change and flux can be understood. Bunge (1979, p.125) for 
example, argues that the view that ‘all change comes from the
“contradiction” or “struggle”… is falsified by all the cases of 
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cooperation both in nature and society.’ Such a framework based on 
contradiction has been at the heart of much critical theory (broadly 
defined) but is based on a partial reading of The Origin of Species. 
This, influenced more by the writings on human evolution of T. H. 
Huxley, very much underplays Darwin’s meticulous picture of 
ecological interrelatedness in which hybridity, variety and ‘mutual 
affinities’ play as much of a role as selection and the ‘struggle for 
existence’ (see Darwin, 1998).  
A different trajectory to both Marx and Hegel was pursued by 
Kropotkin in his work on mutuality. Kropotkin wrote in response to 
such Huxleyan accounts of Darwin that focussed on the survival of the 
fittest. Kropotkin’s view was that this was only one interpretation of 
the processes of evolution. For example, Kropotkin’s research in East 
Asia led him to speculate on the ways in which Darwin’s theory had 
been interpreted. Kropotkin argued that there was evidence of 
mutuality between species in addition to competition. As far as 
Kropotkin (1987 [1902], p.24) was concerned ‘sociability is as much a 
law of nature as mutual struggle’. Human beings, Kropotkin (1987 
[1902], p.43) argued, could not have reached their high level of 
development without a high level of co-operation, particularly given 
their vulnerability compared to other non-human animals. 
Complexity thinking usualy depicts this as the idea of co-
evolution. Interactions between complex adaptive systems can result 
in dynamic changes in both without one being subsumed into the 
other. One example of such a process related to interactions between 
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animate and inanimate systems is the recent research that suggests 
that the use of tools by early humans led to increases in brain sizes 
which in turn led to the development of more intricate tools (Spier, 
2010, p. 121). This could be seen as a non-contradictory relationship 
between two systems which led to a development of both. Similar 
arguments have also been made with respect to the animate non-
human world. Haraway’s work on historicaly evolving relations 
between humans and dogs, for example, suggests a history of co-
domestication (Haraway, 2003; 2008). The evolution of human 
lifeways and survival practices (ensuring security from predation, 
obtaining food and so on) have been seen as a development of co-
evolution with particular canid social systems (see Clutton-Brock, 
1981, 1995). In addition, it may be argued that such developments are 
les straightforward and that interactions between human and non-
human social systems might be characterised both by contradiction (in 
terms of the predominance of human interests in exploiting the labour 
of dogs for security and hunting), and co-evolution (as companions 
species sharing dweling places in relations of reciprocity) (see 
Cudworth, 2010, p. 152-3).  
As wel as co-evolution a further concept that is used within 
complexity thinking to understand change without contradiction is the 
idea of feedback. In particular, positive feedback – which takes 
systems further away from equilibrium positions, as opposed to 
negative feedback which acts to stabilise systems – can result in 
systems tipping into a different form. For example, there has been 
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much recent concern about positive feedback loops with regard to 
climate change. There is a concern that rising temperatures due to 
increased levels of carbon dioxide wil lead to the thawing of arctic 
tundra releasing further greenhouse gases causing further 
temperature rises (Heimann and Reichstein, 2008). 
While complexity thinking does not exclude the use of 
contradiction as a form of analysis, and we would certainly agree that 
capitalism as a complex adaptive system is mired in contradiction, our 
point is that this is not the only way to understand processes of 
change. Folowing Kropotkin we would argue that human society has 
not solely developed as a result of the working out of contradiction – 
there is mutuality as wel as co-operation. Furthermore complexity 
concepts such as co-evolution and feedback contribute ways of 
analysing change which isn’t always on the basis of contradiction. 
The second area we would see a difference between complexity 
thought and dialectics is with regard to teleology. There can be little 
doubt that Hegel’s dialectical thinking was teleological, in particular 
with the notion of an ‘end of history’, and absolute spirit. We are 
persuaded that Marx can certainly be interpreted in a non-teleological 
way. It is perhaps worth pointing out however that Marx, in line with 
much nineteenth century thinking, did have a stage-ist and 
progressive view of history. Additionaly certain features of capitalism 
appear to be regarded as having qualities of inevitability. 
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Our concern, however, is that there is a teleological legacy from 
Hegel that dialectics finds hard to shake off. Titles of significant 
Marxist analyses of dialectics such as Rees’ The Algebra of Revolution, 
and Ollman’s Dance of the Dialectic suggest that there is rather more 
of a pattern to dialectical processes than complexity thinking would be 
comfortable with. Smith (1993, p. 92, emphasis added) points to the 
teleological aspects of Marxist dialectics in drawing a comparison with 
the Hegelian approach to history:  
For Marx history ultimately is not a process of the unfolding of spirit, but 
rather a sequence of modes of production… the form of their historical 
theories is quite similar. For Marx each mode of production plays a necessary 
role in the development of the human species… It [dialectics] remains a 
methodology by means of which each stage is assigned its necessary role in a 
teleological process of development. 
   
Ultimately the process within dialectics of contradictions moving 
the historical process appears to imply a forwards motion. This was 
certainly the case in Hegel, and may have become embedded within 
dialectical thinking more generally. In a related statement discussing 
Marx’s methodology Ollman (2008, p. 16) notes that ‘Marx sought to 
steal the secret of the future from its hiding place in the present.’ This 
statement also implies a level of predictability of the future. Bunge 
(1979, p. 129) criticises this tendency towards the prophetic in 
Marxism by noting that ‘we have learned at great social cost that 
nothing in evolution, whether social or biological, is inevitable: there 
are accidents of all kinds as well as unpredictable innovations.’ 
Inherent in the complexity approach is a rejection of all 
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teleology and determinism (Cudworth and Hobden, 2012, pp.177-
178). In a world of non-linear relations and multiple over-lapping and 
intersected systems it is the unexpected that is to be expected rather 
than the anticipated. As Eliott and Kiel (1997, p. 68) suggest, 
‘Nonlinear dynamics . . . lead us to question the extent to which we 
may be capable of both prediction and control in social and policy 
systems.’ From this perspective the important issue is to deal with 
living with complexity, and the need to take this into account in the 
consideration of alternate futures. 
The final difference between dialectical thinking and complexity 
approaches is that the former, in common with much thinking in the 
social sciences, tends to take an anthropocentric approach. While 
complexity thinking does not necessarily escape from 
anthropocentrism, our position is that, given the analysis of embedded 
and overlapping systems, it implies and alows for, the development of 
non-anthropocentrism (Cudworth & Hobden, 2013a). Hegel’s analysis 
of dialectics was clearly human-centered, and focussed as we saw 
earlier on the development of human consciousness. His philosophy of 
history was a canonical example of a hegemonic cultural model which 
bound humanism to a conception of European civilization. This, in 
turn, was coincidental with ‘the universalizing powers of self-reflective 
reason’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 13). However, if the non-human world is 
understood as both self-organising and as co-evolving; and if humans 
are understood as embedded in and constitutive of configurations of 
‘natureculture’ (Haraway, 1997); then Hegel’s model of dialectics is 
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certainly a limited, partial one, and very much a project of European 
liberal humanism (see Spivak, 1999). 
As with the question of teleology there is more debate over what 
might be termed the ‘nature’ question in Marx’s works – and there 
would certainly seem to be indications that Marx viewed humanity as 
part of nature. By moving the focus of the dialectic onto the material 
would also suggest the possibility of overcoming a human/non-
human nature divide. However Marx would appear to share, with 
Hegel, the view that a feature that distinguishes humans as a species 
was work. As Sayers (2003, p. 110) notes ‘work is a mode of this 
practical being-for-self and a means by which it develops. Work 
involves a break with the animal, immediate, natural relationship to 
nature. In work, the object is not immediately consumed and 
annihilated. Gratification is deferred. The object is preserved, worked 
upon, formed and transformed. And, in this way, a distinctively human 
relationship to nature is established.’ This, then, is a partial ontology 
of the material. The range of (new) materialist approaches have, 
despite significant differences in approach and focus, suggested a 
more radical embedding of the human animal in the multifarious 
relational systems and processes of the non-human lifeworld (see 
Conneley, 2013; Cudworth and Hobden, 2013b). In the process, some 
have argued that the development of more inclusive materialisms 
involves the abandoning of dialectics as a mode of analysis hopelessly 
mired in an exclusive form of humanism (see for example, Braidotti, 
1991). Pheng Cheah (2008) uses the phrase ‘nondialectical 
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materialism’ to counter pose the materialism of Marx with that of 
Deleuze and Derrida. He considers that the problem with the reduction 
of the material to labour is a more general problem of negation. In 
suggesting that human beings indirectly produce actual material life 
when we produce our means of subsistence through labour, Marx 
implies that material reality is produced by negativity (Cheah, 2008, p. 
144). A move away from the primacy of negation, for Cheah, is the 
linchpin of a non-dialectical materialism. As we have suggested above 
however, it is not necessary to abandon contradiction entirely with the 
use of complexity analytics. Rather, material change may be 
characterised by mutuality or by both contradiction and mutuality (as 
in the case of companion species co-evolution). 
We would concur that such a focus on labour, and the 
humancentric production of the material entirely through negation is 
problematic, however. Hence, as is also frequently discussed, Marx 
centred his analysis on production and on the social relations that 
surround this – so it is unavoidable with this as a focus that the 
approach would be human centred. Marx’s perspective on labour,  
Smith (2001, p. 87) argues ‘limits what can and can’t be said about 
nature and it is because of this emphasis on the dynamics of human 
labour that nature finds itself marginalized in spite of Marx’s 
materialism.’ Thus nature’s role in the production process is to be 
consistently dominated and subordinated by human activity, as 
implied in Marx’s (cited in Smith 2001, p. 88) statement that ‘the 
labour process is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the 
29 
 
requirements of man.’ Nature, in this account would appear to be a 
resource to be drawn upon to fulfil human requirements.  
The non-dialectical materialism of Cheah and others (Braidotti, 
2002) is not, however, a path we would necessarily recommend. 
Derridarian deconstruction is often profoundly immaterial – focusing 
(albeit criticaly) on the human productions of language and text (see 
Calarco, 2008, p. 148-9). The dynamic, fluctuating, enlivened world of 
Deleuzian (new) materialists such as Cheah certainly appreciates the 
embedding of the human animal in a world of non-human beings and 
things (see Bennett, 2010). Yet it is also unable to account for the very 
kinds of power relations with which the materialism of Marx was so 
crucialy concerned. Our version of posthumanist materialism draws 
on complexity thinking in order to account for power as oppressive 
and exploitative as wel as (re)productive. Our relations with non-
human systems are of overlapping lifeways and entangled lives, and of 
co-evolved histories. Yet the systemic relations of capitalism, 
colonialism and patriarchy have fundamentaly shaped the ways things 
are and the processes of their becoming so. Here, our critique of Marx 
was that his incredible interventions never realised the potential of an 
important claim in his earlier works that ‘Man [sic] lives from nature, 
i.e. nature is his body, and he must maintain a continuing dialogue 
with it if he is not to die’ (Marx, 1975, p. 327). 
 
Conclusions 
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Dialectics, as broadly perceived, represents a chalenge to 
positivist and mechanical accounts of the social world. Existence is 
perceived as comprising numerous elements in as state of constant 
interaction and change. Attempts to analyse that focus on a specific 
element in an unchanging form wil lead to limited perceptions. Thus 
far complexity thinking would be in total agreement with dialectical 
approaches. Where the differences emerge are primarily in the area of 
contradictions, teleology and anthropocentrism. These points, we 
would argue, certainly hold for Hegelian dialectics, though are more 
disputable with regard to Marx’s use of dialectics. The question is to 
what extent the Hegelian legacy hangs over attempts to take dialectics 
in a non-teleological, non-anthropocentric and able to accept 
mutuality in addition to contradiction. If such an approach is seen as 
contributing to dialectical thinking then an engagement with 
complexity thought could provide a means of developing such an 
approach. 
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